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DID LAST TERM REVEAL "A
REVOLUTIONARY STATES' RIGHTS
MOVEMENT WITHIN THE SUPREME
COURT"?
Jesse H. Choper*
The major role of a commentator, as everyone knows, is to
disagree with the principal paper. But I have no real quarrel with
the Supreme Court decision-making theories that Professor Nagel
has addressed. Indeed, if anything, I would be even more hesitant
than he is in finding a "revolutionary states' rights movement
within the Supreme Court,"2 especially in respect to the decisions
of last Term. And that, after all, is what prompts this symposium,
entitled "The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez."
I.
I do believe, however, in an enhanced "Future of Federalism,"
which is the subtopic for this discussion, although perhaps it might
more accurately be described as "an increased concern for states'
rights." But, in my judgment, the support for that movement is not
primarily coming from the Supreme Court.
This is not to say that the judicial branch will be inactive in
this area. Indeed, at least in the absence of any changes in person-
nel, I believe that the principle of New York v. United States,3
which establishes that the Tenth Amendment prevents Congress
from "commandeering" a state's legislative process, will be imple-
mented further by the Court. In particular, we should watch the
* Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, University of California Law School at
Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
1. Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643 (1996).
2. Id. at 643 (quoting Timothy M. Phelps, Judicial Revolution; Recent Cases Slant
Towards States, NEWSDAY, May 29, 1995, at A13).
3. 505 U.S. 144, 144 (1992).
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constitutional challenge to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act,4 which requires state law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks on all purchasers of handguns.' Indeed, it may
even be that a majority of this Court will overrule Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority6 and return to the philoso-
phy (if not the result) of National League of Cities v. Usery.7 But
the cases that I have just mentioned involve attempts by Congress
to regulate, as the Court put it in National League of Cities, the
"States as States."8 This area is plainly distinguishable from United
States v. Lopez, which involved no attempt by Congress to regulate
the states at all, but rather to govern the activities of private per-
sons within the states.9 It was in this setting that the Supreme
Court, for the first time in more than half a century, invalidated an
act of Congress of this kind as falling outside of the commerce
power.' o
Still, I think that the stronger efforts on behalf of states' rights
are going to come from the political branches. The return of wel-
fare to the states represents a rather perverse congressional concern
for states' rights-another example of Congress (and the President)
making a lot of noise without putting anything up. Much more
important for the furtherance of state interests are the restrictions
on unfunded mandates, even though they may be limited in their
first iterations as Professor Nagel suggests."
II.
I would like to underline my agreement with Professor Nagel
that Lopez is a very narrow decision. 2 That position is contrary to
much conventional wisdom, most notably disclosed by the view of
criminal defense lawyers who are raising constitutional challenges
4. See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding constitution-
ality of the Brady Act).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994).
6. 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) (holding that the political process, rather than judicial
enforcement, is the "principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power").
7. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (finding legislation enacted under the commerce power
as an unconstitutional invasion of state sovereignty), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
8. Id. at 837.
9. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
10. Id. at 1634.
11. See Nagel, supra note 1, at 645.
12. Id. at 661.
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to what seems to be every federal criminal statute in the United
States Code. 3 My limited appraisal of Lopez's impact is also con-
trary to the result in several important lower court decisions. The
most significant of these is from the Ninth Circuit, United States v.
Pappadopoulos."4 Pappadopoulos involved the federal arson stat-
ute, which requires the government to prove a connection between
the arson and interstate commerce in each prosecution."5 In the
case before the court, the house that was set on fire consumed
natural gas delivered from out-of-state sources. 6 The Ninth Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Lopez for its conclusion
that the federal statute could not be constitutionally applied to
these facts on the basis that the interstate effect of this particular
house's receipt of natural gas from interstate commerce was not
"substantial," and therefore the matter was beyond Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause. 7
I disagree with the Pappadopoulos analysis, and believe that
the Supreme Court would also differ with the Ninth Circuit's rea-
soning and result." Nonetheless, using a similar rationale, several
federal courts have ruled that prosecutions under the Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992, the federal "deadbeat dads" law, are also
beyond congressional power.9
13. See Deborah J. Merritt, Commerce!, 94 McH. L. REv. 674, 712 (1995) ("In the
first three months after Lopez was decided, the lower courts issued more than three dozen
opinions exploring the bounds of Lopez."); id. at 712-28 (describing the range of cases
that are raising constitutional challenges to federal criminal statutes); see also Stephanie
Stone, Lopez Defense Meets Little Success in Stopping Federal Crime Prosecutions,
WEsT's LEGAL NEws, Oct. 3, 1995, at 1 ("Courts have weighed in on the constitutional-
ity of 12 federal offenses already, and an Aug. 30 report by the Bureau of National
Affairs details 24 more that could be potential targets for attack. One lawyer was quoted
by The Washington Times as advocating raising the Lopez defense against charges under
the statutes until appeals courts take a stand on each one.".
14. 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en
banc).
15. Id. at 524 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994)).
16. Id. at 525.
17. Id. at 527.
18. The defendants in Pappadopoulos were also convicted of mail fraud and received a
concurrent sentence. Id. at 534. After unsuccessfully petitioning for a rehearing en banc in
the Ninth Circuit, the government decided against seeking review in the Supreme Court.
But see Ramey v. United States, 24 F.3d 602, 610 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding conviction
under the federal arson statute on facts clearly no stronger than in Pappadopoulos), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1368, recons. denied, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20011 (D. Ariz 1995); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 730
(W.D. Tex. 1995). But see United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616-17 (W.D. Va.
1995) (holding that the Child Support Recovery Act is constitutional because it is limited
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A careful reading of the Court's opinion in Lopez indicates
that Congress has two possible means of achieving essentially (if
not exactly) what it sought to accomplish by the statute that the
Court invalidated. First, it appears that Congress could reenact the
identical statute, as long as it produced findings showing that pos-
session of guns near schools had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
20
Second, the Lopez opinion made even clearer that Congress
could enact another statute prohibiting guns near schools, as long
as it included a jurisdictional element as part of the offense.2 ,
This would require that the prosecution prove some nexus to inter-
state commerce in each caseY
HIf.
Another decision that Professor Nagel pointed to--and that
commentators and journalists have also raised-as a "pro-states'
rights" decision of the Supreme Court last term is Missouri v.
Jenkins,' which held that a federal court may not mandate, as
part of a desegregation remedy, that a school district become a
magnet to attract white students from outside the district.24 The
Court relied on the principle that an interdistrict remedy can only
to matters having a substantial effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Hampshire,
892 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (D. Kan. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of the Child
Support Recovery Act by finding its jurisdiction to be limited to actions having an effect
on interstate commerce).
20. In fact, Congress has already done so by an amendment in 1994, two years after
the Lopez prosecution began. See Gun-Free School Zones Act, ch. 44, sec. 320904,
§ 922(q)(l)-(3), 108 Stat. 1776, 2125-26 (1994).
21. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 ("[Section] 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
affects interstate commerce.").
22. See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 577 (1977) (holding that congres-
sional intent to require even a minimal nexus between interstate commerce and firearm
possession is sufficient to satisfy the Commerce Clause).
This element of the offense would be very easy to satisfy because, as I understand
it, virtually every firearm used in this country is produced in one of two states: Connecti-
cut or Massachusetts. Therefore, every gun outside Connecticut and Massachusetts has had
a direct connection with interstate commerce. Indeed, the appeals court had earlier noted
"that a BATF agent was prepared to testify that Lopez's gun had been manufactured
outside of the State of Texas." United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1368 (5th Cir.
1993).
23. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995). See Nagel, supra note 1, at 645 (pointing to Jenkins as
evidence that "State's rights seem at least momentarily ascendant").
24. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2051.
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be imposed for an interdistrict constitutional violation," and found
that there was no such violation in Kansas City.6 This decision,
however, was not at all surprising, nor, for that matter, especially
"conservative" for the area of desegregation remedies. Three years
earlier, the Court acted at least as "conservatively" in Freeman v.
Pitts27-- and at least as favorably for states' rights-in ruling that
a federal district court could withdraw supervision over certain as-
pects of a school desegregation process when it had achieved uni-
tary status (such as teachers) even if there were still other aspects
in the school system (such as students) that had not been fully
remedied.'
IV.
The third major decision, and probably the one that received
the greatest media attention, offered as support for the resurgence
last Term of the Court's interest in federalism, is United States
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.29 There, the Court held that Article
I's age, citizenship, and residency requirements for federal legis-
lators are exclusive, and therefore a state's addition of another
qualification, term limits, is unconstitutional." First, it should be
noted that although the ruling imposes a limit on state power, it is
not a core federalism decision. If basic questions of federalism
involve the allocation of power between the national government
and the states, the U.S. Term Limits ruling fell outside this realm
because the Court clearly limited all power in respect to qualifica-
tions, the authority of Congress as well as that of the states.3'
U.S. Term Limits, in contrast to rulings like Lopez, is much more
like the Court's decisions restricting all government power in favor
of individual rights, at least in the analytical structure that catego-
rizes decisions as concerning either (a) federalism, (b) separation of
powers, or (c) individual rights.32
Nonetheless, it is certainly true that Justice Thomas's dissent,
25. Id. at 2048 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974)).
26. Id. at 2050.
27. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
28. Id. at 485-500.
29. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
30. Id. at 1852.
31. See id.
32. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLIICAL PROCESS
1-2 (1980) (proposing such an analytical structure).
667
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as both Professor Nagel and the media have pointed out, has po-
tentially far-reaching implications for the state authority secured by
the Tenth Amendment. It is also true that his opinion was joined
by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and O'Connor. However, I
think that lineup was more a function of the dynamics of Supreme
Court decision-making and opinion-writing than a reflection of a
uniform statement of views, most clearly for Justice O'Connor, and
perhaps for the others as well.
V.
More telling, in my view, was the fact that Justice O'Connor
did not join Justice Thomas's very forceful (indeed, revolutionary)
concurrence in the Lopez case. The majority struggled (unsuccess-
fully, as Professor Nagel has pointed out 3) to draw some analytic
line between what Congress may and may not regulate pursuant to
its commerce power. Justice Thomas did not agonize. He forth-
rightly called for a return to the "original understanding" of the
Commerce Clause, and a reconsideration of current doctrine to
impose "real limits on federal power."34 Historically, he reasoned,
"commerce consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as
transporting for these purposes," and "was used in contradistinction
to productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture," '3
and certainly did not comprehend all activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. 6
Whether one agrees or disagrees with Justice Thomas's posi-
tion, his effort to put real limits on congressional power must be
conceded. More importantly, however, his approach plainly does
not represent the views of a majority of the Supreme Court.
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy filed a very narrow concurrence in
Lopez 7 and indeed, as already indicated, Chief Justice Rehnquist
(joined by Justice Scalia, who made no additional comment) pro-
duced a very restrictive opinion for the CourtY.3 None went along
with Justice Thomas.
As is most often true, only time will tell whose view will
33. Nagel, supra note 1, at 652-53.
34. 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
35. Id. at 1643.
36. Id. at 1644.
37. See id. at 1634-42 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
38. See id. at 1626-34; see also supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
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ultimately prevail. I believe that some of the lower court decisions
mentioned earlier39 will soon reach the Supreme Court and we
will have an opportunity to hear more from the Justices. Until
then, I think that it is fairly telling that in lower court decisions
upholding federal power since Lopez, the Supreme Court has either
affirmed on the merits' or denied certiorari.4
VI.
I want to make a final point, one of personal privilege. I fully
agree with Professor Nagel's analysis of the unresolvable dilemma
that he describes.42 On the one hand, as we all know, the Consti-
tution grants the national government only limited powers. On the
other hand, some of the powers given, particularly the Commerce
Clause, at least as interpreted, are broad enough to allow Congress
to regulate virtually all aspects of human affairs.' I also fully
agree with Professor Nagel that the history of the Court's attempts
to put limits on the Commerce Clause, and that includes its re-
newed effort in Lopez, is "littered with one failed and discarded
doctrine after another."'  Therefore, it should come as no surprise
to anyone familiar at all with my work that this confirms my view
that the Supreme Court should not treat these questions as justicia-
ble.4'
My argument has been that issues of federal power versus
states' rights are highly pragmatic in nature. That is, the fundamen-
tal issue turns mainly upon the relative competence of different
levels of government to deal with national societal problems-the
39. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733 (1995) (rejecting
Commerce Clause challenge to RICO conviction); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
115 S. Ct. 834, 839-40 (1995) (reading the Federal Arbitration Act as evidencing
Congress's intent to fully exercise its Commerce Clause power so as to prevent a state
from applying its own anti-arbitration law).
41. See Merritt, supra note 13, at 735-38 (discussing such cases where the Court has
denied certiorari).
42. See Nagel, supra note 1, at 647.
43. See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 554 (1995) ("[W]e
have a collection of doctrinal rules that, if we take them seriously, allow Congress to do
anything it wants under the commerce power.").
44. See Nagel, supra note 1, at 654.
45. See CHOPER, supra note 32, at 171-259 (arguing that "there is little justification for
the Court's stamping its imprimatur on so many exercises of national power to protect
against so few constitutional violations of the federalism precept").
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ultimate question being whether this is a problem that requires a
national solution. In respect to that type of inquiry, the Supreme
Court is inherently no more capable than Congress and the Presi-
dent in making a correct judgment. Indeed, history has confirmed
that the Court is less capable. Therefore, it ought to leave these
questions to the political process. This is particularly true because,
in contrast to the forces and values that are at stake in respect to
individual rights, states' rights are well represented in the national
political process.4 Thus, Supreme Court review on behalf of
states' rights, in contrast to its interventions on behalf of individual
rights, which are not usually well represented in the political pro-
cess, is neither desirable nor needed.
46. But see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers":
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 798 (1995) ("The political
power that Wechsler and Choper say the states have over national politics often will not
be used to promote constitutional federalism. Indeed, just the opposite may well be the
case.").
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